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I. INTRODUCTION
Attainment of Nigerian independence from British colonization on
October 1, 1960, was the beginning of a brave effort towards economic
independence without which political independence was meaningless.
Prior to 1960, the affairs of the territories that later became Nigeria were
dominated by British commercial companies. These territories were ad-
ministered by Great Britain through a- charter granted to the Royal Ni-
ger Company in the 1800s. When Great Britain revoked this charter in
1899, England ruled Nigeria through appointed governors.'
Under British administration indigenous people suffered untold dis-
crimination. For the most part, indigenous people were used as cooks or
as house, office, garden, and cleaning workers. Many were recruited for
World Wars I and II and then abandoned.2 Indigenous people were tact-
fully excluded from white collar positions, including government and
1. The Royal Niger Company (RNC) had competed fiercely with the Portuguese in the
late 19th century for African coastal business and was deeply involved in Nigerian retail and
mining trades. It was the British "front" in Nigeria. Nigerian cash crops existed for the Brit-
ish to export to Britain. The pattern of remote control by foreign companies is identical, See
Adedeji, Historical and Theoretical Background, in INDIGENIZATION OF AFRICAN ECoNO-
MIEs 29 (A. Adedeji ed. 1981). In Nigeria, Britain wielded control through the RNC
chartered in the 1800s as its agent and administration. J. COLEMAN, NIGERIA' BACKGROUND
TO NATIONALISM 36, 41, 82 (1958). The RNC charter was revoked in 1899. Id. at 87, 89.
2. The participation of Africans and particularly Nigerians in World Wars I and II
under the British Crown are nowhere recorded in history. This author asserts that many
Nigerians fought under British command in World War Il. Nigerial initiated a recognition of
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banking.' British law firms dominated the courts; British trained indige-
nous lawyers, however, had little or no opportunity to compete until in-
dependence, when several were named Queen's Counsel in recognition of
their service.
The natives excelled in transportation, retail business, and indige-
nous agriculture. For example, the Ojukwu and Okoli Transport Serv-
ices were well known. The policy of excluding indigenous people was
also exhibited in the mining and retail trade sectors. Mineral rich areas
were appropriated for exploitation in the name of the British crown to
the exclusion of natives. Natives were only employed to work as laborers
in the mines.4
During the British administration and under the British policy of
"divide and rule" an elite group emerged. This group's arrogance and
brand of patriotism later plunged the country into the 1966-1970 civil
war.5 As a consequence of this war and the colonial specialization of
agricultural production, food production declined drastically.6 Further,
all its fallen soldiers after the civil war. Many Nigerians soldiers still train at England's
Sandhurst.
3. Banks were dominated and run by expatriates who recruited young high school grad-
uates from England for training in Nigeria. The African Staff Union had extreme difficulty
getting recognition to bargain collectively for its membership for terms of employment in the
Bank of West Africa and Barclays Bank (Dominion, Colonial, and Overseas), now Interna-
tional, during the 1950s. See What Future For the Educated African? W. AER., Feb. 6, 1937,
reprinted in W. AFR., Feb. 2, 1987, at 210; Adedeji, supra note 1, at 29; Balabkins, Factors
Which Have Influenced Nigeria's Industrial Development, 35 RivLSTA INTERNAZIONALE DI
SCLIEZE ECONOMICHE E COMMERCIALi 29 (1988).
4. This was clearly the case with the tin mine region of Jos which was appropriated by
the company for the crown in the 1920s. See Tin (Export from Nigeria) Ordinance and Tin
(Production and Export Restriction) Ordinance, THE LAWS OF NIGERIA, chs. 214-15 (1947)
[hereinafter The Tine Mine Ordinance]. Under the ordinance, tin mining was appropriated by
the Crown (the British Government). See Adedeji, supra note 1, at 17-19. The author dis-
cusses land acquisition by force, military or legal.
5. See Brooks, Nigeria Trying to Start Over Amid Recession and Turmoil, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 23, 1987, at Al, col. 1. The article outlines most of the obvious problems. See After the
Balk A Survey of Nigeria, ECONOMIST, May 3, 1986, at 42.
6. Before the civil war, some of Nigeria's main agricultural export products were palm
produce, cocoa, groundnuts (peanuts), and cotton. Items for local consumption consisted of
yams (not American yams), Cassara, rice, and a variety of domestic tubas and vegetables.
Agricultural shows encouraged production. But the civil war, oil, and government planning
displaced agricultural production to its present low status. See Rimmer & Douglas, Growth
and Anti-Growth in West Africa, 2 . CONTEMP. AFR. STUD. 239-56 (1983); see also N.
BALABKINS, INDIGENIZATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THE NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE
(1982). In the years before independence, the country did not rely on oil but on cash crops.
See After the Balk A Survey of Nigeria, supra note 5, at 42. See generally Adedeji, supra note
1, at 86; THIRD WORLD A'TUDEs TOWARD INTERNATIONAL LAv: AN INTRODUCTION
(F. Snyder & S. Sathirathai eds. 1987)[hereinafter THIRD WORLD ATTITUDES]; Ferguson,
Redressing Global Injusticev The Role of Law, 33 RUTGERS L. REv. 410, 410 (1981).
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crude oil became the single money-making commodity. Nigeria's expor-
tation of oil raised false hopes of prosperity and led to its present plight.
II. THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF INDIGENIZATION
A. Legal Aspects Ignored
A characteristic weakness of contemporary economic theory on in-
digenization is the absence of any analysis of its principal legal aspects.7
Many economists have begun to recognize that legal aspects ought to be
considered as complimentary and necessary ingredients of planning for
development.8 Economists have begun to see also the international as-
pects of problems associated with indigenization and development. 9
The purpose of this Article is to examine some of the legal problems
of economic development through indigenization laws, focusing on Nige-
ria's experience. For this purpose, some sections of the 1977 Nigerian
Enterprises Promotion Decree (NEPD) will be discussed because they
convey lessons for planners in the less developed countries. These obser-
vations do not single out Nigeria. They are designed to assist planners in
the development of future programs for all the developing countries.' 0
Further, this Article suggests international legal solutions to address the
issue of fronting, which many economists have identified as the major
reason for the failure of Nigeria's indigenization program.
It is well known that Nigeria's indigenization plans were a colossal
disappointment to Nigerians and their admirers." This Article is neces-
sary because of Nigeria's resolve in November 1987, in the midst of de-
clining crude oil revenues, to rejuvenate its indigenization plans.12 The
Babangida Administration also has decided to speed up agricultural pro-
grams, which received little or inadequate attention during the earlier
administrations."3 If Nigeria exercises greater caution and fiscal restraint
7. See Adedeji, supra note 1, at 95.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See generally id. at 95-106. It should be noted that in Zambia, for example, many of
the domestic companies were still administered from Southern Rhodesia and South Africa,
Thus local companies did not create any policies but simply carded out policies from their
respective headquarters. Id. at 106.
11. See J. COLEMAN, supra note 1 (citing the Industrial Panel Report).
12. See Brooks, supra note 5 (confirming the Nigerian Government action).
13. The neglect of agriculture began with the civil war, which was followed by the oil
boom. The neglect of agriculture was then worsened by the Shagari's monopolistic distortion,
named the Presidential Task Force, which focused attention on importation of essential com-
modities. The Task Force was headed by former Minister of Transport Alhaj Umaru Dlkko.
Loans to agriculture promoted by the Shagari Regime were guaranteed by the Government for
political supporters and failed because they were not repaid. Loans for agriculture and licenses
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in this new attempt and combats the legal problems overlooked by previ-
ous administrations, it could emerge a model and shining example. It is
for Nigeria's guidance and that of countries with similar predicaments
that these warnings are given.
14
B. Objectives of Indigenization Laws
Nigeria's experience with expatriate companies such as the Royal
Niger Company (RNC) may be characterized as exploitative.15 Expatri-
ate firms had undermined the country's economic interests so that, even
after independence, efforts at reforms were fruitless because of obstacles
posed by the existing legal system.6 Existing laws catered to the inter-
ests of expatriate firms and the colonial masters and thus were unsuited
to deal with post independence revamping of the economy through in-
digenization.11 Most of the laws were British laws which were adminis-
tered and enforced in Nigeria.
Nigeria's indigenization decree, first promulgated in 197211 and then
amended in 1977, was designed to ensure a reasonably equitable spread
of economic participation among Nigerians. 9 The Government made
provisions to ensure that workers acquired equitable interests in the vari-
ous enterprises in which they worked.2 0 The law also provided for the
for importation of machines, equipment, and essential commodities were not given purely on
the basis of need. Consequently, agricultural and industrial programs were not vigorously
pursued in good faith and in a manner devoid of politics. The plans lacked accountability
which characterized Shagari's Administration. Talents and machinery were wasted ushering
in an era of idleness. Fronting was the "in thing." See C. ACHEBE, THE TROUBLE WITH
NIGERIA 5 (1983); see also Populism, Babangida Style, W. AR., Nov. 10, 1986, at 2376; see
also infra note 37.
14. These observations are designed to help Nigeria or any other less developed country
(LDC) proceed cautiously.
15. The RNC was chartered by Britain and worked for British interests. Nigerian inter-
ests were not considered by these parties in their contracts. Profit was the main goal of the
colonialists.
16. Hence, indigenization became a sine qua non.
17. See The Tin Mine Ordinance, supra note 4. These laws transferred control of produc-
tion and restricted export except as directed by the governor. See . COLEMAN, supra note 1,
at 87, 89.
18. The 1972 Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree (NEPD) became effective in 1974.
The 1977 Decree re-enacted the 1972 Decree with pertinent changes to deal with the crippling
problem of "fronting." Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree (Jan. 12, 1977) [hereinafter
NEPD (1977)].
19. The 1977 Decree, §§ 9, 11, set maximum limits on what a person could own in an
enterprise to insure that other Nigerians got some share of the economic pie. Equitable redis-
tribution was the cardinal goal. See id. §§ 7, 9(1), (2), 10(l)(a), (b), 1 l(l)(b), (c).
20. Through fronting, actors circumvented the law with the acquiescence of the leaders
and the wealthy.
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training of managerial and skilled labor, which was very scarce. The
Government assured Nigerian and alien businesspeople that the purpose
of the Decree was not to nationalize industries and expel aliens, but to
promote joint ventures between the government, natives, and foreign in-
vestors.2" At that time the primary purpose of the indigenization decree
was to promote and protect Nigerian participation in all areas of the
economy.22 Thus, businesses within the competence of indigenous exper-
tise were reserved exclusively for indigenous people to exploit under
Schedule .23 Other businesses requiring more capital and greater mana-
gerial or technical expertise were reserved under Schedules II and III for
the joint participation of indigenous people and aliens.24 The require-
ment of joint participation in these areas defused rumors of expropriation
or nationalization often inimical to foreign investment.
The concept of indigenization developed pari pasu with political
awareness as far back as the 1950s when Africans started demanding self-
determination. Policies of the colonial administrators which discrimi-
nated against indigenous people accelerated political awareness.25
Although such policies were not promulgated, they were vigorously pur-
sued in the public and private sectors. They left the citizens on the side-
lines because control of economic and business affairs was jealously
guarded by foreign administrators. Foreign firms, such as the John Holt
and Co., Ltd., the United Africa Company Limited, and A.G. Leventis
Ltd., had access to credit and loans for their various business ventures,
yet indigenous people were denied access to these financial resources for
monopolistic reasons. Natives were not considered part of the economic
process.26
In the agricultural sector foreign firms set up grain, cocoa, and pro-
21. See NEPD (1977), supra note 18, § 7(l)(a). The Section makes an exception to allow
alien participation even in Schedule I provided that the capital allocated is substantial and that
the business is spread over at least ten states in the country.
22. The objective of the Government is self-sufficiency for every Nigerian,
23. See NEPD (1977), supra note 18, § 4(1); see also Doz & Prahald, How MCS's Cope
with Host Government Intervention, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1980, at 149-57,
24. See NEPD (1977), supra note 18, §§ 5, 6.
25. Discrimination against indigenous people and the attendant exploitation had reached
a point where it assumed a central role in the African demand for self-determination in the
1950s. Former British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan recognized this aspiration when he
spoke of the wind of change blowing across the African continent, See Adedeji, supra note 1,
at 86.
26. The industries and banks were British controlled and served British interests. Even
the legal profession was dominated by expatriate firms. Nigeria's highest Court of Appeal was
the British House of Lords.
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duce Marketing Boards which the populace initially viewed favorably. 7
They soon became instruments of oppression. As agents, these Boards
bought cash crops such as palm produce, cocoa, cotton, and groundnuts
(peanuts) at special discounts from native farmers and then sold them at
handsome profits and commissions to their foreign collaborators. Na-
tives worked for these official institutions because they could not compete
with them. Those natives who later attained supervisory positions
learned, inter alia, not only the art of discriminating against their own
kind but also how to rationalize it.28 A handful of these loyalists later
became licensed agents for the Boards. Thus, as agents, they were au-
thorized to deal directly with the cash crop farmer.2 9 In reality these
agents benefited the expatriate buyer who had the cash, the resources,
and the foreign connections.3"
l. LEGAL PROBLEMS
A. Fronting Problems
1. Fronting and Its Impact
Since the 1975 Industrial Panel Report cited fronting as one of the
devices used by unscrupulous businessmen and government officials to
disembowel the economy, fronting has emerged as the most devastating
threat to the Nigerian economy.31
Fronting, which is the primary target of the 1977 NEPD, is even
27. The Produce Marketing Board was one way of maintaining control of all agricultural
produce. All primary products were shipped to England.
28. Persons who attained these ranks were considered loyal and honest by their British
employers.
29. In turn these elites learned from their colonial masters how to manipulate the system
to the benefit of expatriate collaborators who used them as fronts. The licensing of indigenous
people as agents was for the benefit of licensors.
30. As licensed agents, they dealt directly with the farmers but were mere fronts. That
was the origin of fronting accomplished through ordinances and the background of marketing
boards. N. BALABKINS, supra note 6, at 45-48; J. COLEMAN, supra note 1. See Adedeji, supra
note 1, at 17, 164-65.
31. See N. BALABKINS, supra note 6; see also Adedeji, supra note 1, at 85-86. According
to the 1975 Industrial Panel Report, many basic defects in the 1972 initial NEPD contributed
to the failure of the indigenization exercise. Such defects included:
1) lack of power for NEPB to seal up defaulting enterprises;
2) failure to make it obligatory for more companies to seek compliance by issuing their
shares through the Lagos Stock Exchange;
3) failure to match equity participation with management control;
4) failure to provide for prior NEPB or C.I.C. approval of all share prices sold. Opera-
tors still prefer private evaluations of prices of shares to an evaluation by the C.I.C de-
spite the 1977 Decree;
5) failure to lay down a basis for ensuring a wider spread of ownership of shares sold; and
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more prevalent due to bureaucratic attitudes. a2 It is encouraged by high
ranking public officers and politicians who use agents, decoys, and for-
eign middlemen to mask their covert activities.3 Frontmen undertake
various assignments which include, but are not limited to: fomenting
religious and ethnic troubles, intervening in business transactions for
commissions or for selfish reasons, meddling in politics, and negotiating
sales of crude oil abroad. Getting anything done involves layers of "run-
ners" and "frontmen" who work with invisible public officials.34  To
avoid detection and implication in any wrongdoing officials work under-
cover.35 Fronting incidents intensify and immobilize both the govern-
ment and the Board.3 6 Fronting is the major reason behind the collapse
of most Nigerian regimes, especially the Shagari Administration.37
Fronting abuses have taken different forms as principals and accom-
plices regrouped using and fabricating various personal and legal entities.
In private settings, regrouping takes the form of gifts of stocks, options
or the like.38
Nigerians are also used as instrumentalities. For example, default-
ing enterprises use natives as managers while real control is not relin-
quished. 9 With the papers exchanged, the Nigerian manager is led to
believe that he has a stake in the company. Other defaulters transfer
shares privately to Nigerians without the approval of the Capital Issues
Commission (C.I.C.), the agency authorized to evaluate the prices of the
6) weak and under-staffed administrative machinery for implementation of the Decree.
This was the result of an acute shortage of trained personnel.
32. According to the Industrial Panel Report, fronting is Nigeria's number one problem,
It leads to all other problems and raises the broader question of failure of leadership. See C.
ACHEBE, supra note 13, at 5 (discussing the problems of leadership).
33. Highly placed officials fell prey to the ploys of expatriate businessmen. They became
agents for the personal monetary gains of these businessmen.
34. See C. ACHEBE, supra note 13, at 7.
35. Fronting activities take place under the table and the operators prefer to remain invisi-
ble making sure not to generate any tangible legal evidence. Consequently use of masks,
decoys, and agents are essential to avoid implication. But the Government could have used
circumstantial evidence if it was serious.
36. Government officials put materialism and image ahead of pursuit of culprits, making
governance extremely cumbersome.
37. All eyes turned to "self" first rather than service to the nation. See Populism,
Babangida Style, supra note 13, at 1376. The President of Nigeria, I. Babangida, criticized the
Nigerian elite for its pessimism, lack of patriotism, and use of religion as a divisive tool,
38. Corporations and partnerships continue to regroup into subdivisions and subsidiaries
to make detection of their activities difficult to monitor. Many Nigerians received stocks for
fronting but not the power to manage the businesses. See N. BALABKINS, supra note 6, at 45.
48, 174-76.
39. Many companies that defaulted resorted to hiding behind natives. They used officials
in power, who then became fronts, as their masks.
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shares to be sold or transferred. Most of these irregularities occur under
the eyes of government officials who choose not to blow the whistle in
exchange for shares in the same defaulting companies or some other kind
of private compensation.' °
Fronting thrives on the acquiescence or connivance of people in
power. Hence, Nigerians cannot escape the indictment that they gave
and still give active accommodation to fronting.4" The recent five million
dollars worth of Nigerian securities lost by a DHL delivery van and
found by fishermen in New York is evidence of the role of fronting in the
securities market.42
During the negotiation of business transactions, fronting continues
to muddle communication between the principal parties.43 Government
officials often make direct negotiations difficult by interjecting a decoy
between the parties. This decoy errands between the parties thereby
masking corrupt officials from detection.
Similarly, the issue of fronting has widened the gap between the
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board (NEPB), the C.I.C., and the La-
gos Stock Exchange on the issue of approval of exchange of shares, eq-
uity participation, and management control.' NEPD Section I l(i)(c)(i),
pursuant to Section 9, sets a maximum limit of equity participation in an
enterprise. However, enforcement of Section 11 has been a problem.45
40. Government officials were thus paid with stocks not to blow the whistle.
41. Many companies were involved, especially during the currency exchange exercise of
1984. See Britain Is No Friend, The Guardian Newspaper, Aug. 18, 1984, at 6, col. 1 (Letter
from Boniface E. Nnodim). Customs and police officers were implicated in the 53 suitcases
episode involving a prominent leader. Those suitcases were allowed through the airport termi-
nal without routine check by the Department of Customs and Excise. After the fact, Dr.
Soloye, Minister of Finance, told the nation in a televised broadcast that it was a mistake. The
Buhari Regime made no arrests. See Blacklist of Economic Saboteurs, W. AIR., Feb. 11, 1985,
at 282; Nigeria Currency Change, W. AFR., May 26, 1984, at 1103; Crackdown on Assassins,
W. AFR., Jan. 16, 1989, at 80 (covering police participation in criminal activities).
42. See Five Million Niara Securities Picked by Fishermen, N.Y. Post, Apr. 6, 1988, at 5,
col. 3; see also CB.N. Adviser Fired 60m., W. AFR., Mar. 7, 1988, at 429. C.B.N. is the Central
Bank of Nigeria. The adviser, Dr. Williams, and his accomplice, Mr. Edward Thomas, a
manager of Nigerian Merchant Bank, were jailed for 20 years at hard labor for illegal foreign
exchange transactions. The article provides supports the belief that perpetrators of the white
collar crime of fronting have not relented and have extensive international connections.
43. Fronting made direct negotiations difficult. Efficiency was sacrificed; inefficiency and
laziness were promoted.
44. Officials used messengers and other decoys to circumvent efficiency. Fronting was
also used to block other officials from performing their duty. Files disappeared for weeks when
they were needed. The Saraki controversy over the 2.8 billion dollar tape was stymied by
fronting. In the end the person who should answer the questions was freed while the junior
television worker who did the recording during the testimony was fired for doing her job.
45. See N. BALABKINS, supra note 6, at 174.
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Names of various family relations are used by frontmen to evade Section
11 restrictions on individual holdings. This is evidence of rampant white
collar crime that must be addressed if Nigeria expects to eliminate
fronting.46
2. The Negative Role of Licensing in Indigenization
The idea of issuing a license to authorize the performance of a cer-
tain service was initiated by the pre-independence administration so as to
exclude citizens from competing in various business.47 Only the groups
the administration licensed, such as Marketing Boards, could buy cash
crops directly from the natives. Although this practice has been de-
nounced as colonial, Nigerian government officials continue to use it to,
immobilize certain segments of the population by excluding them from
participation in the marketing or importation of various commodities.
Licenses have been issued on the basis of "who you know." Anyone who
wishes to obtain a license for importation of goods needs the services of
frontmen or strawmen who peddle influence and "know the ropes."
Since frontmen are likely to obtain most of these licenses through
their connections, each license so obtained costs a fortune in cash which
is shared by the frontmen and their accomplices (the officers). As the
frontmen hawk the licenses for the highest economic rents, human and
economic resources are idle.4a Former President Shagari's Administra-
tion was well known for its issuance of licenses to those who had no need
for them while manufacturing plants stood idle. His Presidential Task
Force (P.T.F.) issued innumerable licenses to fronts who sold them to
importers of essential commodities for substantial economic rent.4 9 The
P.T.F. created untold hardship for the creative abilities of the people, the
spirit of hard work, industry, and agriculture. It encouraged fronting
and the activities of middlemen. It instilled in the citizenry a total depen-
dence on the P.T.F. for imported goods and discouraged farming in the
rural areas at a time when Nigeria should have been producing more at
46. See Five Million Niara Securities Picked by Fisherman, supra note 42.
47. A license authorized the licensee to trade in the specific commodity. Without this
authorization natives could not market their cash products themselves.
48. The impact of fronting on the import licensing program is an example of how fronting
helps create idle capacity. There are accounts of fronting plaguing levels of administrations in
other countries. Examples abound in Washington, D.C., after details of fronting operations
were unveiled in the Iran-Contra affair. It remains a problem in Panama and throughout tile
world. Fronting is an ethical problem of the highest priority and cries out for international
attention.
49. See Adedeji, supra note 1 (discussing the Presidential Task Force (P.T.F.)). The
P.T.F. turned Nigeria into an importer of all kinds of goods and services and either directly or
indirectly completely devastated agriculture.
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all levels to offset lost oil revenues. Because Nigeria depends mainly on
crude oil revenues, it needs diversification to survive.
B. Expatriate Manipulation of Invoices and Foreign Exchange:
Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Fawaz
Fronting makes it possible for expatriate business to hawk blank in-
voices in violation of Custom and Excise regulations. Fabricating in-
voices is commonplace, and officials who authorize imports also work
with expatriates for personal ends.5" When apprehended, the accused
negotiates a quick settlement with the arresting officers, since a formal
court proceeding often involves delay and exposure. When formal ar-
rests are made, some unpatriotic officers opt for "dash" (payment of
money or services) for personal enrichment. There are situations, how-
ever, in which honest officers have refused to give in to foreign corrupt
practices. In 1984, the Decree 7 Tribunal sitting in Kano convicted Mr.
Abdullahi Fawaz of Exchange Control violations.5"
In many instances, fronting leads to the abuse of authority by public
officials. Under section 12 of the NEPD, inspectors possess the power to
make instant arrests and are authorized to inspect buildings and busi-
nesses. Under this provision, the refusal of a proprietor or agent to allow
inspection or scrutiny of records constitutes an "obstruction"-a punish-
able offense under the Decree.52 Political caterpillars (people who cor-
rupt public officials) use their power as fronts to block the course of the
law.
53
Section 13 authorizes the closing of any alien business the authori-
ties find to be in contravention of sections 5, 6 or 7 or any other provision
50. Supervising customs officials will appear on duty or mill around to assist foreign busi-
nessmen with whom they have established "business" relations.
51. Mr. Abdullahi Fawaz, a young Lebanese businessman from a wealthy family, received
the shock of his life when his attempt to implicate a loyal and patriotic customs officer who
arrested him for Exchange Control violations did not succeed. Thus in Federal Republic of
Nigeria v. Fawaz (Decree 7 Tribunal, 1984), Mr. Fawaz was convicted of attempting to leave
the country with $5,000 concealed in the pocket of a pair of female blue jean pants in his brief
case without proper declaration on the Exchange Control Forms. When the foreign currency
was uncovered, Mr. Fawaz was unable to bribe the arresting customs officer and consequently
alleged that the officer was angry because he did not bring him a gift of a safari suit. The
Chairman of the Decree 7 Tribunal, Mr. Justice Oladipo Williams, described the defendant's
story as "dangerous." Mr. Fawaz also had a Nigerian passport No. 1164521 issued in his
name in Lagos. See Oroh, Alien Opens His Defense Friday, Nigerian Guardian, Sept. 4, 1984,
at 16, col. 4.
52. See NEPD (1977) supra note 18, § 12. In that situation an officer had police powers
of arrest as well.
53. It is not unusual for political heavyweights to obstruct the course ofjustice. Abuse of
authority led Nigeria into the cement cases. See infra note 142.
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of this Decree.54 In terms of enforcement, the authority of the Minister
of Trade and Industry conflicts with that of the Board, the C.I.C., and
the Minister of Internal Affairs (Immigration). This complicates the de-
cision-making process.55 Highly placed politicians and officials also ex-
ploit the conflict to their benefit.
C. Corporate Exploitation of Indigenous Labor
Fronting also encourages corporate exploitation of indigenous labor.
For example, Robatek (Nigeria) Limited, a company owned and run by
Indians, would not pay compensation to Toyin Osho, a part-time em-
ployee who was trapped between the conveyor belt and the giant corru-
gating machine used by the manufacturing company; Adebisi Atolagbe
lost his fingers while working on a machine and was discharged without
compensation; 56 and James Amadi, another part-time employee, suffered
the same fate on December 19, 1986."7 Protests to management of this
company produced no compensation.58 The employees also fear losing
their twelve hours per day job which pays only five Naira.5 9
The above evidence shows that fronting has been at work in indus-
trial and corporate circles as the agent of exploitation. There is no rea-
son to allow Robatek to continue to manipulate human lives purely for
profit as the colonial masters did. At Robatek, the least paid Indian
earns 1,006 naira per month, has free housing and a company car, and
enjoys other generous allowances.' Established in 1981, this company
has no Nigerian employee who earns 500 naira per month; there are four
Nigerians and six Indians in the management cadre.6 Robatek's strate-
gies constitute an affront to the labor and constitutional laws of the coun-
try. Its activities could not have taken place without the ominous role of
fronting.
IV. PENALTIES FOR FRONTING
The law clearly provides under section 17 of the 1977 Decree that:
54. See NEPD (1977), supra note 18. Officers did not use their police powers to force
compliance with the law.
55. See id. § 13. This caused indecision and "no man's land," The result is delay and
inefficiency.








(a) any person who acts as a front or purports for the purpose of de-
feating or in manner likely to defeat the object of the Decree, to be
owner or part owner of any enterprise; or
(b) operates any enterprise for or on behalf of any alien who is under
this decree is
(i) not permitted to operate the enterprise, or
(ii) disqualified from operating the enterprise, or
(iii) not permitted to own or be part owner of such enterprise
shall be guilty of an offense under this section and shall be liable
on conviction to a fine of 15,000 naira or to imprisonment for a
term of 5 years or to both such fine and imprisonment.
In addition, section 17 made it unlawful for any citizen to employ a
former expatriate owner of a Schedule I enterprise on a part-time or full-
time basis without prior approval of the Federal Minister of Internal Af-
fairs after consultations with the Board.62 In many instances, a proper
evaluation of the circumstances is not practicable because fronters inter-
vene between the conflicting authorities.63 The events that led to the "ce-
ment Armada"" in the late 1970s provide a picture of the difficulty
posed by bureaucracy and the get-rich-quick mentality of the elites and
power brokers who cultivate strawmen.
Furthermore, under section 18, the NEPD provides, inter alia, that
any person found guilty of an offense "under this decree for which no
penalty was provided shall upon conviction be liable to a fine of 10,000
Naira65 or to imprisonment for five years or both."66 If a corporate en-
tity violates the fronting provision, the court will hold every director or
member of the partnership guilty of the offense unless such director or
partner satisfies the court that he or she did not consent to the violation,
62. The role of the Minister of Internal Affairs, though necessary, adds to conflict in the
distribution of authority.
63. See supra notes 43-44.
64. This nomenclature described the historic logging of Nigerian ports with cement orders
by authorized and unauthorized "agents" of the Nigerian Government for the construction of
army barracks and Festac housing. Many foreign exporters sued and recovered from Nigeria.
Nigeria's invocation of the act of state doctrine did not persuade the courts. See, eg., Texas
Trading and Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981); Na-
tional Am. Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). There are
many more decisions from Germany and the Netherlands. These happened because of official
tolerance of fronting. Additionally, there is no protection for whistle blowers. The fate of
whistle blowers has been made more uncertain by the Reagan Administration. For example
see U.S. Indicts TRW Whistle Blower, The Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio), Apr. 7, 1988, at 1,
col. 3. The Reagan Administration is after whistle blowers instead of the culprits.
65. NEPD (1977), supra note 18, §§ 18(1), (2)(a).
66. Id.
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or did all he or she could to prevent it.67 Because -the law enforcement
arm of the Government does not invoke this section, corporations take
advantage of every opportunity by frequently restructuring and regroup-
ing. This lack of enforcement provides opportunities for officials and pol-
iticians to use their influence to benefit corporations at the expense of
constituents.68
Given the power of corporate enterprises, the government should re-
examine the language of section 18 to insure that it both deals summarily
with violators and acts as a deterrent.
V. ADVERSE EFFECTS OF FRONTING
Although the laws could have been enforced to deter fronting activi-
ties, the leaders instead benefitted by nonenforcement. Today the conse-
quences of nonenforcement are alarming to the rich and the poor alike.
The system began to crumble when the law enforcement arms of the fed-
eral government learned from other highly placed citizens and officials
how to circumvent enforcement of the Decree. 69 Section 19(1), which
authorizes the involvement of the Attorney General under the Nigerian
Constitution, has not been enforced.70 Instead, it is generally believed
that law enforcement officers, including employees of the NEPB, worked
with political advisers in rehiring or shielding those expatriates in viola-
tion of the Decree. This was sometimes done under the guise that "qual-
ified Nigerians" were not available for the particular position. 71
67. See id. §§ 18 (1), (2)(a) & (1). Officers of a corporation or partnership are individually
guilty unless the officer satisfied the court to the contrary. See No Finger, No Job, supra note
56 (describing how an Indian Company abused Nigerian part-time employees).
68. Both political bulwarks and officials moonlight for corporations as fronts and have no
qualms about it. Corporations pay them in kind with stocks, travel expenses, goods, and other
services not disclosed to the Government. Blacklist of Economic Saboteurs, W. AFR., Feb. 18
1985, at 286. The Lagos Zone of Exchange Control Tribunal jailed Guddy Abugo (Nigerian)
and Nicholas Johannes (Swede) for 15 years each and imposed a seven million Naira fine for
an aborted attempt to transfer seven million abroad. Involved were two Swiss and three Niger-
ian companies. Id.
69. Junior and senior officials all shop in the same markets. Since inflation does not dis-
tinguish between them, junior officers learned the trick of the seniors who make a lot of money
from fronting.
70. See NIG. CONST. § 104 (1979). The Attorney General may not have invoked this
section because no arrests were made. The police constituted themselves judges because lead-
ership was inept.
71. Sometimes this is used as an excuse for tribalism. As Professor Chinua Achebe put It:
"Prejudice against outsiders or strangers is an attitude one finds everywhere. But no modern
state can lend its support to such prejudice without undermining its own progress and civiliza.




Another effect was that law enforcement officers who attempted to
enforce the law in their various jurisdictions were frustrated by influen-
tial politicians and other private citizens who benefit from the illegal ma-
nipulation of this clause. Violations of this provision soon became
rampant because they were condoned by the Government.77 Those of-
ficers who ignored the NEPD for private economic and monetary profit
flaunted their wealth at community fund-raising functions where the var-
ious age groups displayed new found cash. 3 It is believed that other
citizen's foreign accounts swelled from payments from expatriate accom-
plices who benefited frequently from the use of citizens as "fronts."' 4
Many banks also took advantage of the failure to enforce foreign ex-
change regulations.7 5
VI. HOW TO REMEDY THE SITUATION
A. The Nigerian Criminal Code, Ch. 42
The provisions of this Code could have helped the previous regimes
maintain law and order and in dealing with ex-president's staff. For
example:
1) Chapter 4, section 17 states the types of punishments for the
conviction of offenses under this Code. The penalties include death,
whipping, fine, and forfeiture. Section 19 provides that upon conviction,
ill-gotten goods and bribes received will be forfeited in addition to or in
lieu of any penalty under section 17;
2) Section 12, deals with corruption and abuse of office and sections
98 through 111 cover corrupt practices and abuses of office by public
72. Id.
73. Education no longer holds sway. Money now speaks, not a long list of degrees that
cannot buy power and material things. Consequently, many young people head to drugs for
quick money. Although decried by the Nigerian Ambassador, Nigeria should look seriously
into allegations that young Nigerians in the United States are becoming involved in the drug
connection. The allegations may be discriminatory. Nevertheless, they should be taken seri-
ously. See Nigeria: A Damaged Image in the US, W. AFR., Dec. 22-29, 1986, at 2644.
74. Many government officials working in tax, customs, police, and foreign exchange de-
partments of banks are known to live far above their incomes. The same is true for many bank
managers and others who deal with the public directly. Sometimes bank managers are under
pressure from top officials to engage in violations of banking and foreign exchange laws.
75. A few bank managers were punished for violation of the currency exchange proce-
dure. They were caught violating rules on the changing of currency and faced disciplinary
actions. Nigeria Currency Change, W. AFR., May 26, 1984, at 1103.
The indictment of Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), by the United
States is the tip of an iceberg. Foreign banks have been in the center of Nigeria's problems.
Their role in arranging currency flights out of the country, with the acquiescence of authorized
officials, is of particular concern.
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officers. Penalties upon conviction could be either a misdemeanor or a
felony, and a term of imprisonment for three years;
3) Chapter 13, section 112 covers selling and trafficking in offices
and carries a penalty of three years upon conviction;
4) Chapter 14, sections 113-33 cover all facets of judicial adminis-
tration including penalties ranging from three months to fourteen years
for the various offenses;
5) Chapter 38 covers cheating, sections 418-25 outline details of the
offense of obtaining property by false pretenses or cheating. (Note that
this chapter covers various kinds of fraudulent practices and corruption);
6) Chapter 39 sections 427-33 contain details of the offenses of re-
ceiving property stolen or fraudulently obtained and life offenses."
Had these sections of the Criminal Code been vigorously enforced
against offending public officers and their civilian accomplices, corrupt
practices could have been checked if not eradicated. Imprisonment for a
short duration and some restitution would have been a good deterrent.
7 7
The failure to enforce the law was due to either a massive cover-up by the
leadership or unpardonable naivete. The president -was clearly responsi-
ble for what happened in his administration under the laws of agency (for
his action or inaction).7" His ministers and senior officials fall in to a
different category.7 9 To date, a thorough accounting has not been de-
manded of the president's staff as a deterrent. Even when no other pen-
alty is imposed on them, restitution ought to be a requirement for a fair
national redress.
B. International Legal Cooperation
While enforcing local laws, the Government should simultaneously
seek international cooperation abroad. The previous Nigerian adminis-
76. CODE CRIM., cl. 42, The Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, vol. 2 (re.
printed 1981).
77. An appropriate penalty plus restitution should await offenders. The punishment need
not be extremely harsh but enough to be a sufficient deterrent or the younger generation will
receive mixed messages. The United States has good examples of senior politicians and public
officials who have paid for abuse of public office, e.g., a former United States Attorney General
and several senators. But in Nigeria, many things went wrong with the tribunals. See Looking
Back on 1985, AFR. CONCORD, Jan. 10, 1986, at 22. The Attorney General did not exercise
his powers. See Nigeria: The Law as an Ass, W. Am., Jan. 3, 1986, at 227,
78. By his election to the Presidency he was given express authority to administer the
country in trust for the people. That was based on his experience and exposure in public office.
Omotayo v. Ojikutu, (1961) All N.L.R. Prt. 4, at 901; Folashade v. Duroshola, (1961) 1 ALL
N.L.R. 87.




trations should have enlisted international cooperation on many fronts:
business investments, trade, crime, and friendship. While some progress
has been made, the issue of fronting was never addressed even though the
Industrial Panel Report identified the administration in 1975 as a serious
hindrance to the indigenization plan.8"
It is imperative that the administration recognize the role of fronting
in the realm of crime as well as business. "International fronting" con-
tinues to bring Nigeria's business to a standstill.8"
1. The Need for Cooperation
Nigeria must never assume that its indigenization program pleases
everyone. Especially in the international arena, Nigeria should have
known that the previous colonial masters and their allies suffered eco-
nomic disruptions because of the indigenization plans.8 2 Consequently,
the countries that suffered economic losses would always take retaliatory
measures when opportunities arose. For this reason, Nigeria, like any
other less developed country (LDC) in the indigenization process, should
have known to protect itself by treaty or some other "unambiguous
agreement.
83
Already Nigeria has an Investment Guarantee Agreement with the
United States. 84 Therefore, it cannot be said that a treaty or an unambig-
uous agreement for economic relations was outside the reach of this and
previous administrations. The failure of Nigeria to avail itself of such
protective cooperative instruments exposed it to different types of ex-
ploitation in the international arena. Many people believe that, highly
ranked local officials often aided foreigners in their exploitive practices
80. See supra note 31.
81. Fronting depletes Nigerian foreign reserves, with the assistance of persons in author-
ity. See Note, The Act of State Doctrine: Antitrust Conspiracies to Induce Foreign Sovereign
Acts, 10 N.Y. U. J. INT'L L. & POL 495 (1977); "Crafty"Behavior ofAlien Firms, New Niger-
ian, Sept. 18, 1986, at 4, col. 1 (letter from S. Fatahu). Their syphons reach the bottom of the
tills to drain the banks of what is left of their reserves under the kinds of disguise. Unchecked,
this malaise will cause an even greater catastrophe for Nigeria. See C. ACHEBE Supra note 13,
at 221. Adebayo, Nitel Officers Reverted to Previous Grades, New Nigerian, Jan. 2, 1986, at 1,
col. 2.
82. Nigeria's independence destabilized the economy of the United Kingdom, which
through the RNC, had structured the Nigerian economy as a primary source of raw materials
for the British Economy. This was necessary as Europe, led by Britain, moved from rural
agrarianism to urban industrial capitalism. See Adedeji, supra note 1, at 17-19. Nigeria was
locked into a dependent relationship with Britain. Id. at 20; see also J. COLEMAN, supra note
1, at 82, 87, 89 (British pre-war alien oligopoly in Nigeria's export trade); A. BuRNS, HSTORY
OF NIGERIA, 151-52, 163-64 (1955).
83. See Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 298, 428 (1964).
84. 26 U.S.T. 103, T.I.A.S. No. 8102 (1974) [hereinafter Investment Guarantee].
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by looking the other way, rather than questioning some of these
activities.85
Article 1 of the Investment Guarantee provides:
The Government of the United States of America and the Government
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria shall, upon the request of either of
them, consult in respect to projects in Nigeria which are proposed by
citizens of the United States of America with respect to which invest-
ment guarantees have been made or are under consideration.
86
Had a similar clause, appropriately worded, been inserted in the Nigerian
cement contracts, it would have provided Nigeria some protection from
the massive exploitation to which it fell victim in the middle and late
1970s. Nigeria unilaterally cancelled those contracts, many of which
were rife with fraud as a result of fronting. Short cancellation cost Nige-
ria millions of dollars.87
In 1980 Nigeria entered into an understanding with the United
States of America in the field of agriculture. Article 1 of the Cooperation
in Agriculture: Memorandum of Understanding "reaffirm(s] their mu-
tual desire to collaborate in developing programmes and exchanges in all
fields relating to the planning and development of agriculture and ex-
press[es] their intention to continue to explore possible joint activities
which would lead to a broadening of cooperation in this field." 88 Per-
haps Nigerian officials chose not to take advantage of this protective
measure.
A Nigerian-United States Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations
(Treaty of Amity) could have, among other things, specifically provided
85. See Umaru Dikko Wins Plea for Temporary Sanctuary, Daily Telegraph, June 16,
1987, at 2, col. 3; see also Dikko's Reprieve, Daily Mail, June 16, 1987, at 1, col. 2,
Leaders from the states who contracted with foreigners for supplying government busi-
nesses commingled these supplies with their private businesses. Nearly all state governors
under the civilian regime participated in these activities. Even where there is no solicitation,
Nigerian contractors believe that any potential delay or red tape can be cured by gifts to the
person in command. Most officials consider it normal to accept such gifts as part of their
duties. However, acceptance is a violation of the law for which there are sanctions. N.
BALABKINS, supra note 6, at 171-73. Before most national religious holidays, like Christmas
and Easter, police delay traffic, create panic, and confiscate driving licenses for minor excusa-
ble infractions to extort cash from drivers. Money so collected is shared and helps a long way
during the festive period. Brooks, supra note 5; C. ACHEBE, supra note 13, at 37-43;
Agbabraka, Kidnap Trial Verdict, W. AFR., Feb. 18, 1985, at 296.
86. Investment Guarantee, supra note 84.
87. See Texas Trading and Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300 (2d
Cir. 1981).
88. Cooperation in Agriculture: Memorandum of Understanding, July 23, 1980, United
States-Nigeria, art. I, T.I.A.S. 9819, at 2067.
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for the resolution of any problems by providing reasonable and effective
compensation. The clause could have read:
Property of nationals and companies of either Higher Party, including
interests in property or payments due, shall receive the most constant
protection and security within the territories of the other Higher Con-
tracting Party. Such property shall not be taken except for a public
purpose, nor shall it be taken without prompt payment of just and
effective compensation.
Within the framework of this or a similar clause, it is possible and
foreseeable that economic problems arising from fronting perpetrated by
citizens of either High Party could be accommodated. Nigeria, however,
should not take or withhold interest, property or payments due for other
than a public purpose. A public purpose includes national emergencies
or economic crises involving exchange control or the like.89
2. Problem of Uncovering Evidence
The problem, however, remains one of uncovering relevant evidence
which is always hidden from the representatives of such Higher Parties
to the Treaty of Amity and from the courts. With a treaty in place, it is
assumed that the courts of the United States would control the situation
when litigation ensues. But without a treaty or some unambiguous
agreement as a guide to determining the intention of the parties, the par-
ties could find themselves playing hide and seek over the act of state
doctrine. This doctrine precluded the courts from reaching the merits of
the case until the advent of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976.90
When the act of state doctrine is invoked, the first impression is that
foreign states manipulate it to their advantage. It may well be that those
who knowingly operate as fronts in foreign countries manipulate this
89. See American International Group v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 493 F. Supp. 522
(D.D.C. 1980), modified on other grounds, 657 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Allied Bank Inter-
national v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 566 F.Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd on
other grounds, 733 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd & remanded, No. 83-7714 (2d Cir. Mar. 18,
1985) (en bane).
90. When the act of state doctrine is invoked, the first impression is that foreign states
manipulate it to their advantage. It may well be that the actual manipulators of this doctrine
are those who knowingly operate as fronts in foreign countries. They bribe officials abroad to
obtain contracts for construction, supplies, or crude oil. They then retreat to their foreign
bases in the United State, England, and Germany for litigation. In the United States, the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act prohibits bribing foreign public officials, but condones bribery
at the intermediate and lower levels of government. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L.
No. 85-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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doctrine. They bribe officials abroad to obtain contracts and retreat to
the United States for litigation.
C. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 1976: Origin and Cases
The purpose of The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act91 (FSIA) is
to protect the interests of American citizens doing business abroad.
Prior to the FSIA, there was a great deal of confusion and tension over
the application of the act of state doctrine. The act of state doctrine was
first used by the United States Supreme Court in Underhill v. Hernandez
in 1897.92 The case involved the dismissal of a suit for wrongful deten-
tion of an American citizen by the revolutionary Government of Vene-
zuela. The Court established the act of state doctrine in Underhill, when
it stated:
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judg-
ment on the acts of the government of another done within its own
territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be ob-
tained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as
between themselves.
93
This supposedly simple and concise concept -was later extended by
the United States Supreme Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabba-
tino94 which involved the seizure and expropriation of an American
owned subsidiary company, Compania Azucarera-Vertientes-Camaguey
de Cuba (C.A.V.), incorporated under the laws of Cuba and doing sugar
brokerage business. The C.A.V. was also shipping sugar to the United
States.95 Although the C.A.V. was incorporated in Cuba, over ninety
percent of its shareholders were residents of the United States.96 In justi-
fying the seizure the Cuban Resolution cited the
attitude assumed by the government and Legislative Power of the
United States . . . of continued aggression, for political purposes,
against the basic interests of the Cuban economy, as evidenced by the
amendment to the Sugar Act.... Whereas, this action constitutes a
reiteration of the continued conduct of the government of the United
States of North America, intended to prevent the exercise of its sover-
91. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C., Pub. L. No. 94-593 [H.R.
11315] (Oct. 21, 1976).
92. 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
93. Id.
94. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).




eignty and its integral development by our people thereby serving the
base interests of the North American trusts, which have hindered the
growth of our economy and the consolidation of our political freedom.
Whereas, in the face of such developments the undersigned, being fully
conscious of their great historical responsibility and in legitimate de-
fense of the national economy are duty bound to adopt the measures
deemed necessary to counteract the harm done by the aggression in-
flicted upon our nation.
97
Pursuant to these resolutions all sugar-carrying vessels were detained. 93
The consent of the Cuban Government was required before the ships
could leave Cuban waters.99 To obtain this consent, Farr Whitlock and
Co. entered into contracts on August 11, 1960, with Banco Para el Com-
mercio Esterior de Cuba, as the representative of the Cuban Government.
The terms of these contracts were identical with those in the earlier con-
tracts between Farr, Whitlock and Co. and C.A.V.1 ° In an action by a
shareholder in the New York Supreme Court, King's County, pursuant
to New York Civil Practice Act #977-6 for the appointment of a re-
ceiver for the assets of C.A.V. in New York, the New York Court, ex
parte, on the same day appointed the defendant Sabbatino as temporary
receiver.
In the suit that ensued, the district court found that the Cuban De-
cree, Law No. 851, had violated international law in three separate re-
spects: it was motivated by a retaliatory and not a public purpose; it
discriminated against American nationals; and it failed to provide ade-
quate compensation.101 Summary judgment against petitioner was ac-
cordingly granted.1
0 2
The United States Supreme Court held, however, that although the
act of state doctrine is not mandated by the Constitution, it had "consti-
tutional underpinnings."' 03 Hence, in Underhill, the acts of a foreign
state performed in that state were totally immune from scrutiny by the
courts in the United States. In Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
decided sixty-seven years after Underhill, the Supreme Court rejected
the principle of unconditional immunity."° The Sabbatino Court re-
97. Id. at 401 n.7.
98. Id. at 404.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 406-07.
102. Id. at 407.
103. Id. at 423. The doctrine arises out of the relationship between branches of government
in a system of separation of powers.
104. In Sabbatino, the Court adopted the restrictive theory. Id at 428.
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quired a case-by-case evaluation of the circumstances of the "constitu-
tional underpinnings," namely the separation of powers doctrine,103
while it de-emphasized the issue of sovereign immunity.' 0 6 Some com-
mentators argue that the Sabbatino Court established no clear method or
standards of review.'0 7 But Sabbatino was not confusing; its holding was
very clear on the issue of expropriation at bar. It was very clear on mat-
ters which were covered by a treaty or international agreement.
1. Confusion in the Courts
Relying on the Sabbatino decision, the courts of the United States
have for years passed judgments on the acts of foreign sovereigns done
within their territories, to determine whether or not their acts were polit-
ical questions. Such judgments have caused friction. In 1972 the
Supreme Court applied the Sabbatino rule in First National Citybank v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba.'O8 There was no majority opinion in favor of
any one rule of law.
Apart from the division on the applicable legal principle, there was
tension between the judiciary and the executive on pronouncements from
the State Department through its legal advisers." If these institutions
share the same constitutional source of power for involvement in interna-
tional relations, then, there is a basis for judicial resentment to being led
by the nose.
Furthermore, if these institutions, which are presumably more fa-
miliar with Cuban-United' States relations, were in such disarray, Sabba-
tino watchers in other countries, especially those that relied on the act of
state doctrine as originally enunciated in Underhill, were even more con-
fused. These less developed countries are not particularly aware of the
changes ushered in by Sabbatino and other decisions.
2. Dunhill Exception Rejected, But Confusion Continues
Since Sabbatino, the act of state doctrine has been applied to a vari-
ety of cases with difficulty. In Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic
105. Id. at 423.
106. See id.
107. Fruenkin, The Act of State Doctrine and Foreign Sovereign Defaults on United States
Bank Loans: A New Focus for a Muddled Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 469 (1985). See also
Rabinowitz, Viva Sabbatino, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 697, 701 n.27 (1977).
108. 406 U.S. 759, 768, 776.
109. Id. Justice Douglas consistently refused to take directives from the State Department.




of Cuba 1 0 the plurality opinion of the Supreme Court creates a "com-
mercial exception" to the act of state doctrine. The Court determined
that the act of a sovereign state is not political but "commercial," a
phrase that has become quite controversial." The Supreme Court itself
could not agree on this one exception.
Cuba's revolutionary Government nationalized the businesses and
assets of five leading cigar manufacturers." 2 The Intervention Decree ap-
pointed "interventors" to take over and operate the business without re-
pudiating the debt or outstanding obligations of the supplier. InDunhill,
the former owners of the companies sued Dunhill and other importers
for the purchase price of cigars that had been shipped to the United
States prior to the intervention." 3 Dunhill had mistakenly paid the "in-
terventors" for these pre-intervention shipments.' 1 4 The interventors re-
fused to return the funds. 
1 1 5
The issue presented by the petition for certiorari was whether there
was any evidence in the record that the foreign sovereign had done any-
thing which might be termed an act of that state." 6 The Court, in a five
to four decision, found there was no act of a sovereign involved.
1 7
Therefore, the Court found no reason to reconsider the Sabbatino hold-
ing. Justice White wrote the opinion and maintained that the act of state
doctrine should not be applied to commercial transactions.",8 Justice
Stevens did not join in that portion of White's opinion. Others in sup-
port of White were Burger, Powell, and Rehnquist. Justice Marshall dis-
sented, joined by Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Blackmun. The Court
deliberately ignored the advice of the executive by failing to adopt the
"commercial activity exception." It found that there was evidence of an
act of state and that the act arose out of governmental, not a commercial,
transaction. In the Court's view, the Sabbatino rule was applicable."19
In his dissenting opinion Justice Marshall reasoned that the "seizure and
retention of the Dunhill funds were pursuant to the initial intervention
decree" and thus could not be properly characterized as "purely com-
110. Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
111. Id. at 695, 698.





117. See id. at 695.
118. See id. at 728-30.
119. See id. at 729.
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mercial."' 121 Part III of Justice White's opinion in Dunhill represents a
minority of the Court. Many people, however, have since misread the
decision, and refer to Part III as the decision of the Court.
Moreover, the court in Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp. misread the Dunhill
decisionl z  and a number of other cases in which the act of state doctrine
is raised as a defense. Plaintiff Hunt brought an action against defendant
Mobil Oil and other oil producers alleging violations of the antitrust laws
and breach of contract.' 22 Plaintiff asserted tha: the defendants had
combined and conspired to preserve the competitive advantage of Persian
Gulf crude oil over Libyan crude oil by preventing Hunt from reaching a
settlement with the Libyan Government.123 Failure to reach a settlement
resulted in the nationalization of Hunt's Libyan properties.'2 4 Hunt
sought treble damages. The court, relying on Sabbatino's articulation of
the separation of powers doctrine, held that judicial inquiry was fore-
closed by the act of state doctrine. 125 The court even refused to inquire
into the illicit practices of other United States companies against another
United States company. The court's refusal signals indifference to front-
ing and fraud abroad.
In England the highly respected Lord Denning of the English House
of Lords misread the Dunhill decision in Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Cen-
tral Bank of Nigeria.126 The House of Lords had difficulty determining
the character of the activity of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and
therefore, for want of better legal authority, Lord Denning quoted from
Part III of Justice White's minority dictum in Dunhill to sustain the re-
versal of the lower court. He wrongly assumed that the dictum was a
decision of the United States Supreme Court. 2 7 Based on this miscon-
ception, Lord Denning held that the act of the sovereign Government of
Nigeria in contracting for cement for the construction of military bar-
racks was an act of state that fell under a "commercial exception" of the
Dunhill minority view of Justice White.
Lord's Denning's associate on the bench, Lord Stephenson, made
120. See Rabinowitz, supra note 107.






126. See (1977) 1 Q.B. 529 (C.A.).
127. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
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the same error in his opinion.1 28 Lord Justice Stephenson argued: "yet
the government of Nigeria created not a government department but a
bank.. . but all the same a bank with no declaration of government
status; a separate entity not stated to be a government department or to
be immune from suit internally or externally... ."129 Professor McDou-
gal also misread the Dunhill decision when he quoted from Part HII of
Justice White's opinion which he represented in his written testimony
before the English Court. " °
The Dunhill Court characterized the refusal of the interventors to
repay excess receipts to Dunhill as an exercise of only "commercial au-
thority" '131 and noted that no statute, decree, order or resolution of the
Cuban Government itself was offered in evidence indicating that Cuba
had repudiated its obligations in general, or any class thereof, or that it
had as a sovereign matter determined to confiscate the amounts due to
three foreign importers.132 Furthermore, the Court ignored the advice of
the executive and failed to adopt the commercial activity exception.
1 33
Even the circuit courts are not in agreement on whether there is an
exception. 134
This is probably a no-win situation. Had Cuba put a decree in place,
the Court would have held it discriminatory and violative of interna-
tional law. 135 While fairness was and is always an issue, the Court never
clearly drew the line.
In Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria 136 decided in
1977, the British lower court denied the suit by a cement supplier to
128. See 1 Q.B. at 562, 570 (Stephenson, L., concurring); see also Rabinowitz, supra note
107, at 703.
129. Id.
130. Professor McDougal also misread the Dunhill decision when he quoted from Part II
of Justice White's opinion, which he represented in his written testimony before the English
Court of Queens Bench in The I Congreso de Partido, (1977) 1 Lloyd's Rep. 536 (Q.B.)., an
admiralty action. See Rabinowitz, supra note 107, at 702, 703. Although Justice Whites opin-
ion represented a minority of the Court, Professor McDougal claimed Justice White was
speaking for the Court. See Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976); Rabinowitz,
supra note 107, at 699 n.14, 703 nn.38, 41, 43; Davis & Reynolds, Judicial Croippler Plurality
Opinions in the Supreme Court, 1974 DUKE L.J. 59, 61-62.
131. 425 U.S. 682, 694 (1976).
132. Id. at 695.
133. Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 325, 369 n.93
(1986).
134. Compare Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 1977), cerL denied, 434
U.S. 984 (1977) (2d Cir. recognition, in dicta, of the exception) with IAM v. OPEC, 649 F.2d
1345, 1360 (9th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982) (rejection of the exception).
135. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 298, 428 (1964).
136. (1977) I Q.B. 529 (C.A.).
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order the Central Bank of Nigeria to retain a stated amount within the
court's jurisdiction pending trial of the case. It reasoned that the CBN
was immune from suit. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court.
Lord Denning argued that the CBN is a central bank modeled on the
Bank of England: affairs are under a great deal of government control. 137
It acts as a banker for the state within the federation. 38 In any event a
great deal of government control should suggest that the CBN is a Gov-
ernment instrumentality and not a private entity. Such nexus to the
Nigerian Government should trigger immunity at least on a temporary
basis pending further inquiry of act of state or international
agreement.
139
D. Impact of Confusion on Less Developed Countries
It seems that while this debate progressed, less developed countries
(LDCs), including Nigeria, were still relying on the act of state doctrine
as enunciated in Underhill as a solid defense for the acts of a sovereign
state. Perhaps unaware of the erosion that had occurred, Nigeria entered
into contracts with foreign suppliers of cement. 140 The cement was for
the construction of army barracks. 4' In the several cases that ensued,
Nigeria allegedly anticipatorily breached the contracts.14 2 Its defense of
act of state was rejected practically throughout the industrialized
world.'43 Nigeria had unwillingly played into the hands of foreign con-
sultants, suppliers, and their courts in Europe and the United States
137. See 647 F.2d at 300.
138. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) exercises authority over development projects in
Nigeria. In Trendtex Trading Corp. v. CBN, (1977) 1 Q.B. 529 (C.A.), Lord Denning projected
it to be on the same footing as the Bank of England.
139. The CBN should have been accorded immunity as an entity of the Federal Govern-
ment of Nigeria.
140. Nigeria may have been unaware of this shift in the redefinition of the doctrine In
Sabbatino.
141. Nigeria has a number of cement factories but needed more cement for the construc-
tion of the barracks. See Texas Trading and Milling Corp. v. Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir.
1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
142. Id.; Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, (1977) 2 W.L.R, 356, 1 All
E.R. 881 (U.K.); Hispano Americano Mercantil S.A. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, (1979) 2
Lloyd's L.R. 277 (U.K.); Ipitrade International, S.A. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (Int'l
Chamber of Commerce Award, Apr. 25, 1978), enforced 465 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1978);
Youssef M. Nada Establishment v. Central Bank of Nigeria, reprinted in 16 IL.M. 501 (1977)
(Dist. Ct. Frankfurt/Main, Aug. 25, 1976) (W. Ger.); National American Corp. v, Federal
Republic of Nigeria, 597 F.2d 314, 316 (2d Cir. 1979); Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of
Nigeria, 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981); Reale Int'l, Inc. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d
330 (2d Cir. 1981); Gemini Shipping, Inc. v. Foreign Trade Organization for Chemicals and
Food-Stuffs, 647 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1981).
143. See 647 F.2d at 306 n.15, 310 n.29.
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where Underhill had been influenced by Sabbatino and even more so by
the uncertainties of the decision in Dunhill and its commercial exceptions
to the act of state doctrine. With regard to Nigeria, the most trouble-
some concept has been the commercial exception which has been mistak-
enly interpreted as a majority opnion in the lower courts in the United
States and in Europe.
E. Less Developed Countries and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act: Commercial v. Governmental Act
In construing the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) Justice
Irving Kaufman of the New York Court of Appeals noted:
The law before us is complex and largely unconstrued, and has intro-
duced sweeping changes in some areas of prior law.... In structure
the FSIA is a marvel of compression. Within the bounds of a few
tersely-worded sections, it purports to provide answers to three crucial
questions in a suit against a foreign state: the availability of sovereign
immunity as a defense, the presence of subject matter jurisdiction over
the claim, and the propriety of personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. 144
Proceeding to the phrase "commercial activity," the modem basis of de-
nying an LDC's defense of immunity, Justice Kaufman wrote: "Here,
the relevant 'course of ... conduct is undoubtedly Nigeria's massive ce-
ment purchase program. Alternatively, each of its contracts or letters of
credit with these four plaintiffs would qualify as a particular... transac-
tion.' "145 The court correctly noted that "the determination of whether
particular behavior is commercial is perhaps the most important decision
a court faces in a FSIA suit.""' Admitting that the definition of "com-
mercial" is the one issue on which the Act provides almost no guidance
at all, 47 the court, nonetheless, relied on section 1603(d) which advanced
a conduct, rather than a purpose criterion for the particular transaction.
The court concluded that "under each of these three standards, Nigerian
cement contracts and letters of credit qualify as commercial activity.
' '1 4s
Justice Kaufman based his conclusion on Lord Denning's erroneous
writing in Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria. By so
holding, Justice Kaufman demonstrated an unawareness of developments
144. Texas Trading and Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300 (2d
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
145. Id. at 306.
146. Id. at 307-09.
147. Id. at 308.
148. Id. at 315-16.
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in LDCs. The court offered no definition of commercial activity except
its conclusion that contracts and letters of credit we:re commercial activi-
ties. 49 Nor did it advance any justification that the Nigerian purchase of
cement for army barracks was not a governmental act, except the testi-
mony in Congress that a LDC's government purchase of army boots for
its army is now not recognized as an act of state under the FSIA. Partic-
ularly unimpressive is the inability to admit that Dunhill as presently
interpreted, does not solve the problem.
The FSIA raises questions because it implies that a deliberate act of
another state done in its own territory and in its public interest is not an
act of state. It is possible that the FSIA exceeds Congressional powers
under the "Necessary and Proper" clause because the FSIA impinges on
the legitimate sovereignty of a foreign state and its acts. Nonetheless,
"the power is as broad as the need that evokes it." 5'
LDCs argue that the United States-Cuban sentiments of the early
sixties are perpetuated by the FSIA and have been allowed to spill over
to other LDCs.1I 1 Another possible conclusion is that the industrialized
countries have brought the clubhouse to their highest courts especially
the House of Lords and the United States Supreme Court-a replica of
what the industrialized nations did in the political arena in the 1920s.152
The FSIA overrules the decision in Victory Transport v. Comisaria
General de Abastecimientos y Transportes,153 that a contract made by a
government for a public purpose such as bullets for the army, is not a
"commercial contract."' 54 Under the FSIA such a contract is construed
as commercial for the purpose of denying the defense of sovereign immu-
nity when the United States courts need to protect American business-
men.155 Particularly troubling is the levity with which Congress codified
the notion that if a LDC buys bullets for its army, it is not an act of the
government; if a LDC buys boots for the army, it is commercial. Un-
questionably, both the logic of Congress and the courts in Trendtex and
Texas Trading and Milling Corp. put LDCs in a serious predicament. To
do business with industrialized countries amounts to a waiver or surren-
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. M. LITKA, INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT OF BUsI-
NESS 43-44 (1988). LDCs have repudiated existing colonial laws and classical arguments.
152. THIRD WORLD ATTITUDES, supra note 6.
153. Victory Transport v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert denied, 381
U.S. 934 (1965).
154. Id.
155. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C., Pub. L. No. 94-593 [H.R.
11315] (Oct. 21, 1976) § 1603 (d)(e), 1605.
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der of sovereign immunity defenses.1 56 Obviously, these rulings do not
make it particularly attractive for foreign governments to do business
with American corporations, especially because of the inconsistencies in
court decisions.
VII. THE TREATY OPTION FOR THE LDC
Although some courts are still skeptical about the role of treaties
vis-a-vis the act of state doctrine, others have begun to accord treaties
and other unambiguous agreements their proper place in international
relations.
United States suspicion of the traditional act of state doctrine ema-
nated from United States-Cuba relations, which deteriorated during the
Eisenhower Administration. Today there is a feeling that this suspicious
approach characterizes United States dealings with other LDCs. It is
understandable that Nigeria's indigenization program remained suspect
despite Government assurances that the plan was modified to encourage
joint ventures between foreign investors and indigenous people. 15 7 At the
inception of Nigeria's program, planners did not foresee the impact on
the former colonial masters who depended on its economy for sup-
plies."' Also in the midst of oil wealth, officials lost sight of the impor-
tance of international cooperation and assistance, specifically the
importance of treaties and agreements in resolving various economic and
trade disputes.1 9 Although not unaware of the utility of international
agreements, Nigeria did not fully explore its options.
A. Cases on Treaties
The first case to test Sabbatino was American International Group v.
Islamic Republic of Iran in 1980. 1 The facts show that after nationaliz-
ing the insurance companies, Iran failed to pay them compensation de-
spite the provision of the United States-Iran Treaty that "property would
156. LDCs are being told to look elsewhere for those contracts or goods that help them
meet the purposes of the state because buying from the United States will lead to waiver of
immunity. LDCs are sensitive to this approach. See Texas Trading and Milling Corp. v.
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 306, 315-16 (2d Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S.
1148 (1982).
157. See N. BALABKINS, supra note 6, at 241; Rabinowitz, supra note 107.
158. Nigeria was also carried away by oil wealth. Nigeria never had so much money and
public officials were corrupted.
159. See American International Group v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 493 F. Supp. 522
(D.D.C. 1980), modified on other grounds, 657 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Callejo v.
Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1116-18 (5th Cir. 1985).
160. 493 F. Supp. 522.
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not be taken except for public purpose, nor without. prompt payment of
compensation."1
61
Relying on Sabbatino, the district court held that the act of state
doctrine did not preclude the court from reaching the merits of the case
because the treaty provided a specific legal standard on which a decision
could be predicated. 162
In Kalamazoo Spice Extracting Company v. Provisional Military
Government of Socialist Ethiopia (PMGSE), 163 the Ethiopian Provisional
Military Government expropriated Ethiopian Spice Extraction Share
Company (ESESCO) a separate corporation established by Kalamazoo-
Spice (Kal-Spice) in 1975. Kal-Spice retained an eighty percent share of
ESESCO and had an agreement for exclusive purchase of the oleo resins
(spice extracts) to be produced. 16 It financed the production, trained the
staff, and built the production facilities.1 65 Kal-Spice ceased making pay-
ments for pre-expropriation orders which continued to be filled after
expropriation.
In 1979 ESESCO sued Kal-Spice to obtain payments for goods de-
livered. Kal-Spice counterclaimed with a prayer for compensation for
expropriated property. Kal-Spice also sued the Ethiopian Provisional
Government for failure to pay compensation in violation of international
law and the Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations between the
United States and Ethiopia. The damages claimed by Kal-Spice far ex-
ceeded the claims of ESESCO.
166
In the United States district court, PMGSE argued that the Kal-
Spice action was barred by the act of state doctrine.167 Kal-Spice argued
that the Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations provided the control-
ling legal principles required by Sabbatino; the act of state doctrine did
not preclude adjudication of the case. 68 ESESCO :moved for summary
judgment on the ground that no dispute existed over the amount owed to
Kal-Spice. Secondly, it moved for dismissal on grounds of sovereign im-
munity, lack of personal jurisdiction, and the act of state doctrine.1 69
The district court dismissed Kal-Spice's suit and granted ESESCO sum-
161. Id. See Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, Aug. 5, 1955,
United States-Iran, art. II, para. 2, 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853.
162. 493 F. Supp. 522.
163. 543 F. Supp. 1224 (W.D. Mich. 1982), rev'd, 729 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1984).
164. See id. at 1226.







mary judgment on the ground that the treaty relied on by Kal-Spice was
very vague; "it was so inherently general, doubtful, and susceptible of
multiple interpretation" that it did not provide a clear standard to the
court as required in Sabbatino.170 The situs of the expropriated shares
made the application of the act of state doctrine problematic; the expro-
priated shares were within Ethiopian territory rather than in the United
States. 171
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the district court
and found the language of Sabbatino to be dispositive of the case. It held
that the existence of the treaty with language specifically dealing with the
issue before the court required an exception to the act of state doctrine.
The language "such property shall not be taken except for a public pur-
pose, nor shall it be taken without prompt payment of just and effective
compensation" provided a sufficient standard for deciding the case con-
sistent with the Sabbatino mandate.1 72 Thus, in Kalamazoo although the
situs of the shares of stock was in Ethiopian territory, the existence of the
treaty and the specific provision within it dealing with expropriated prop-
erty resulted in a "treaty exception" to the act of state doctrine.
17 3
LDCs must not assume that they can enter into treaties or interna-
tional agreements just for the fun of doing so. These agreements are
meant to be enforced. That is the message from American International
Group, Kalamazoo Spice Extracting Co., and Sabbatino.
VIII. ANALYSIS
Any developing country thinking of implementing an indigenization
program must recognize that what is good for that country may not be so
good for neighboring countries or the colonial master.
An indigenization decree is a local law of the LDC just as the act of
state doctrine is a doctrine established by the United States federal courts
in Underhill. Since the decree is a local law, the LDC is powerless to
170. See id
171. The district court predicated its application of the act of state doctrine on the situs of
the shares in Ethiopian territory.
172. The Sixth Circuit held that the treaty language created an exception to the act of state
doctrine regardless of the situs of the shares.
173. See Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 298 (1964); see also The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969; opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, reprinted in J.M. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, 1981 DOCUMENTARY SUPPLE-
MENT TO THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 237 (2d ed. 1981).
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The Vienna Convention is the authoritative source on treaty
interpretation. It maintains that treaties are to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with
the ordinary meaning given to the text, the object, and the purpose.
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stop its modification. 174 The courts in Sabbatino ushered in the treaty
exception by way of the "constitutional underpinnings." Sabbatino rec-
ognized the circumstances of United States-Cuba political relations when
it modified the absolute, unconditional act of state doctrine of Underhill.
The purpose of the modification was to prevent Cuba from expropriating
the assets of United States investors in Cuba and then selling those assets
in the United States to the so-called "thieves market."' 75
A. LDC's Problem with the Treaty Option
Most LDCs still have problems with the Sabbatino "treaty excep-
tion." They do not appear to recognize that once a treaty is in place it
amounts, under the FSIA, to an implicit waiver of sovereign immunity.
Hence, after a LDC enters into a treaty, if some problem specifically pro-
vided for in the treaty develops, an attempt to introduce the defense of
act of state doctrine is only available under Sabbatino or a treaty excep-
tion. 176 In other words, the defense is restricted by the treaty from which
the LDC cannot unilaterally extricate itself. The basic justification is the
sanctity of contracts. The FSIA specifies that there is no act of state
immunity in any case in which the LDC has waived its immunity either
explicitly or by implication. This is true even if the LDC later withdraws
the waiver which the LDC purported to effect, except in accordance with
the terms of the contract.177  Thus, LDCs ought to know that a treaty
triggers an exception to the act of state defense and permits judicial
scrutiny.
78
174. The indigenization decree is promulgated by the military government of the LDC; In
the United States the act of state doctrine is judge-made law, i.e. common law, Each is a
legitimate component of the nation's sovereignty.
175. This was a description coined for the special markets where goods expropriated by
Cuba were sold. To expropriate the investments of Americans and sell them to other Ameri.
cans in America generated, hence the name "thieves market."
176. See Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Government of Socialist
Ethiopia, 729 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1984), rev'd Ethiopian Spice Share Co. v. Kalamazoo Spice
Extraction Co., 453 F. Supp. 1224 (W.D. Mich. 1982); American International Group v. Iran,
493 F. Supp. 522, 523 (D.D.C. 1980).
177. A less developed country should therefore not toy with a treaty if it does not intend to
enforce it under the U.N. Convention concept adopted in May 1969. Treaties are meant to be
enforced notwithstanding a purported waiver. Vienna Convention on Treaties, supra note 173;
see Ipitrade International, S.A. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 17 I.L.M. 1395 (1978). Nigeria
signed the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of
June 10, 1958.
178. See supra note 176. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(1); H. R. Rep. No. 94-1487, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. at 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws, at 6617




When a LDC agrees to adjudicate all disputes arising under a con-
tract in accordance with Swiss law and by arbitration under Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce Rules, such an agreement constitutes a
waiver of sovereign immunity under the FSIA.179 "The legislative his-
tory of this section expressly states that an agreement to arbitrate or to
submit to the laws of another country constitutes an implicit waiver."',"
In this instance the logic and the reason are correct.
C. Erroneous Conception by Congress
There is another problem with the court's ruling in Texas Trading
and Milling yet unaddressed by commentators. In the cement cases tried
in the United States courts, the issue was never raised that the FSIA was
erroneously conceived by Congress. The statute suffers from the propa-
ganda of its authors.18 "Wishing to put the best light on what they were
doing, they drafted the statute in terms of the arguments made for it,
incorporating a number of the legal misconceptions that were frequently
voiced during the Sabbatino controversy. "182 One such incorporation is
Dunhill's commercial exception.
Based on this misconceived incorporation, United States district
courts are now telling LDCs what they can or cannot decree in their own
territories and what their objectives or purposes must be, as was the case
when the league was made up of only industrialized nations who manipu-
lated the rest of the underdeveloped world. This club must be removed
from the courtroom. The LDCs are being told that buying cement in the
market place for the construction of army barracks or purchasing boots
179. Ipitrade International, SA., 17 I.L.M. 1395. Nigeria is a signatory to the 1958 Con-
vention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and should have
known that an arbitration agreement amounts to an implicit waiver of sovereign immunity
and, therefore, cannot be unilaterally breached without legal consequences. This author's arti-
cle on the 1958 Convention appeared in the Texas International Law Journal in 1974. A
different version of the article also appeared in the Journal of World Trade Law also in 1974.
See supra note 176.
180. 729 F.2d at 425; Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1116-18 (5th Cir. 1985).
See Vienna Convention, supra note 173, art. 3 1(1); see also supra note 179.
181. See Henkin, Act of State Today: Recollections in Tranquility, 6 COLUM. J. OF TRANs-
NAT'L L. 175, 180 (1967).
The FSIA suffers from the defect of the Second Hicken-Cooper Amendment. The statute
is an instruction to the courts, but it is not very instructive. This absence of clear instruction is
echoed by the court in Texas Trading and Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647
F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
182. 647 F.2d at 310.
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and gas masks for the use of the country's army is riot a legitimate act of
state.
This is not logical. LDCs are being told that buying boots for the
use of the LDC's army is not a public purpose immune from industrial
scrutiny if the goods are purchased in the United States; that even if the
contract is entered into in the LDC's territory, under the FSIA the pub-
lic purpose is inconsequential.' 83 This kind of reasoning makes it im-
practicable to reach a consensus in the courts. The FSIA may be
negatively affecting American competitiveness and balance of trade pay-
ments by diverting purchases to other countries with laws more sensitive
to the needs of developing economies. Admittedly, the FSIA is law and
federal judges must interpret the law. This law, however, makes the pub-
lic purpose of acts done in the LDC's own territory inconsequential, by
defining them as commercial acts. Congress has told LDCs to take it or
leave it. Because the FSIA holds LDCs prisoner even in their own terri-
tories, the chain reaction in the area of LDC's debts is not surprising. In
turn, the LDCs seems to be saying "take it or leave it." Recent reactions
from Peru and Nigeria are vivid examples.
184
In any event LDCs must begin to recognize that the FSIA is Ameri-
can federal law which the United States district courts have power to
enforce. Any LDC that cannot refrain from what the FSIA labels as
183. Id.
184. Debtor countries should pay their obligations to their creditors. When a government
changes leadership and is ultimately recognized by a foreign state, such recognition is retroac-
tive to when the new leadership came.into power. The new leadership commits itself to previ.
ous obligations including all foreign debts which sometimes can be staggering and a real
burden to the domestic economy. The lack of understanding displayed by the Second Circuit
in Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, cited as Allied I, Allied II,
and Allied III, created new frustrations in LDCs. See 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983),
aff'd on other grounds, 733 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd and remanded, No. 83-7714 (2d Cir,
Mar. 18, 1985)(en banc). The courts pushed Costa Rica into a corner despite its internal
currency crisis and its agreement with the creditors to reschedule its payments within the
International Monetary Fund framework. The consequence of such judicial intrusion is the
unilateral refusal of Peru to pay its debt. Then Nigeria unilaterally cut its payments to one-
third because of internal fiscal pressures.
Continued intrusion from the courts may generate retaliation by way of massive revolt
from LDCs. They may not withdraw their funds from the United States. However, the possi-
bility of maintaining only small amounts of needed reserves in the event of confrontation and
confiscation cannot be underestimated.
Nigeria is now working out a program for rescheduling its payments. Ironically, these
debts were incurred during the oil boom. Nigerian leaders were cajoled and bribed by foreign
banks to borrow. Most of it was squandered in overpriced contracts and projects that never
were implemented. See After the Ball, supra note 5; see also Update: Nigeria, Afr. Report,
Nov.-Dec. 1988, at 12 for the Nigerian repayment schedule which is comparable to the terms
offered Brazil and Mexico.
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expropriation must find its army boots and tanks elsewhere or make do
with items made in its home territory. In fact, the FSIA may be doing
the LDCs a good turn in disguise.
The Second Circuit which disallowed Nigeria's defense as commer-
cial in Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria 1 5
allowed the defense in Empresa Cubana Exportadora de Azucar y Sus
Derivados v. Lamborn and Co. "6 Lamborn and Co. involved the Cuban
Governments seizure of plaintiff's assets, just like in Dunhill, and drama-
tizes the inconsistency in the court's approach. In Hunt v. Mobil Oil
Corp.,"8 7 which involved antitrust claims against six major oil companies,
the court held that the act of state doctrine required judicial abstention.
No sound reason was advanced for stepping into the Nigerian situation
except that the FSIA codified it.
D. Fronting, Fraud, and Deceit
In all of the cases discussed above, the one item that has so far
eluded the courts is fronting. The courts have not exposed fronting's
hidden role in international business. Fronting was evident in the bribery
of the Petroleum Minister Umm Al aywayn in Clayco Petroleum Corp.
v. Occidental Petroleum Corp."'8 It was evident because identical un-
dercurrents to those in the Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp. also infested the
Nigerian cement program. Without the involvement of frontmen or
strawmen, how could so much cement be ordered by a government that
knows the limited monthly and annual physical capacity of its ports?
It is obvious that the Nigerian Government's one time cement pro-
gram was inadequately managed by authorized officials.18 9 It was not
well monitored or supervised and decision makers inevitably leaked con-
tract information to strawmen. 19  Furthermore, foreign "consultants"
induced unidentified or unidentifiable officials to cooperate with fronts.
Many of these foreign "consultants" or suppliers constantly hovered
around middle and lower level officials looking for an opportunity to en-
list their services for extra pay or "grease" or "dash."
The evidence of contracts tendered in court showed, as the court
properly noted, that the contract forms were "mimeographed." 191 Mid-
185. 647 F.2d 300.
186. 652 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1981).
187. 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
188. 712 F.2d 404, 407-08 (9th Cir. 1983), cerL denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984).
189. Decision makers were involved in whatever went wrong.
190. The leak of documents is the responsibility of corrupt officials and fronts.
191. 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981).
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die and lower level officials then circulated these forms all over the world
to commit the Nigerian Government to the cement purchases.192 Having
discovered the fraud perpetrated by strawmen, Nigeria was in a position
to raise the issue of fronting and fraud as a counterclaim to defeat the
claims of some of the fictitious suppliers. The Government chose not to
waive its immunity. Thus, the court was not given sufficient basis to
deliberate on the issue of fronting. The underworld of fronting pays
money to keep evidence out of the courts to avoid the embarrassment
that would otherwise ensue.
Besides, courts do not appear enthusiastic about recognizing the
phenomenon of fronting. Just as courts were reluctant to delve into the
act of state doctrine in the first place, so today courts hesitate to decide
issues of fronting, fraud, and deceit in international business.1
9 3
There appear to be no decisions on the issue of unauthorized front-
ing and fraudulent inducement commited as an act of state. The "ce-
ment armada" cases were unique in that although -they resulted from an
act of state to purchase cement for the construction of army barracks, the
act caused an economic crisis requiring action by the state.' 94 When the
fraudulent activities of frontmen were investigated, it became necessary
for the Government to meet with all the entities that claimed to be "sup-
pliers."' Many of such claims were not recognized by the Government
in a unilateral move. Many were considered fictitious and the work of
frontmen, some of whom were aided by lower ranking personnel in the
Government and private sector.'
96
The outcome of the case might have been favorable to Nigeria if it
had counterclaimed on the issue of fronting and fraudulent inducement
of its officers by the plaintiffs. Such a defense strategy would have com-
pelled the court to investigate the act of a foreign state to determine the
issue of fraudulent inducement. Such a defense could not be volunteered
by a foreign sovereign if the state wished to preserve its immunity. Nige-
ria probably chose not to waive its immunity under the circumstances
and thereby conferred victory on the suppliers.
In effect, the way the law is presently construed is inimical to the
interests of the LDC whose authorized officials are bribed to commit the
192. See id.
193. Bayzler, supra note 133, at 328.
194. See supra note 142.
195. See 647 F.2d 300.
196. See Adedeji, supra note 1, at 85-86. Junior officers and officials learned how to be
fronts from the leadership or bosses. After all, they argue, they also buy goods on the same
market and inflation does not discriminate between the rich, the middle class, and the poor,
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government to projects under similar situations. If the evidence or coun-
terclaim is not raised, the courts have no other recourse but to find for
the plaintiff as a matter of law. In National City Bank of New York v.
Republic of China (NCBN) 197 the United States Supreme Court held that
a bank could assert counterclaims to recover on a sovereign's defaulted
note. NCBN, however, had no immunity at stake. Even if a sovereign
defendant in response to an economic crisis specifically decreed an action




The failure of law enforcement officials to enforce the NEPD or to
invoke related Nigerian laws in the interest of protecting honest individu-
als heightened Nigeria's ethical crisis. This inaction created questions
regarding the need and use of laws, including the 1977 Decree, and
whether indigenization is really a viable alternative.1 99 The question that
Nigeria must examine is whether the law is a boon or a bane considering
its effects so far. But more importantly, is international law helpful to
supplement or complement local law?
It is now clear that Nigeria is boldly embarking on another plan in
the midst of dwindling oil revenues, unemployment, and other economic
problems. Nigeria plans to give law enforcement the highest priority at
the local level, and priority to governmental treaty efforts to deal with
the problem at the international level. Enforcement at the local level will
help the Government to remove dishonest leaders throughout govern-
ment. Senior officials are often deeply involved in the sale of commodi-
ties, including sales of crude oil to foreign firms that undermine national
interests. The laws should reach their accomplices in the private sector
and impose harsh penalties. Only by renewed effort to enforce the law
evenly, will the public's loyalty, confidence, and desire to rebuild the na-
tion be reborn.
Since 1960, Nigerian leaders have taught the citizenry that it pays to
197. See 647 F.2d at 303. For corruption, see N. BALABKINS, supra note 6, at 173, 175.
198. See Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, cited as Allied I,
Allied II, and Allied III. In Allied I the act of state doctrine was upheld. It was affirmed in
Allied II, upholding the act of the Government of Costa Rica to steer the economic crises of
the country and therefore, the act of state doctrine applied. In Allied III, the same three judge
panel reversed its earlier holding in Allied II and held the act of state inapplicable. 566 F.
Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 733 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984), rep'd & re-
manded, No. 83-7714 (2d Cir. Mar. 18, 1985) (en banc).
199. If indigenization laws are not being enforced, should they continue to be on the books?
Is indigenization still a viable objective and alternative to an open market?
1989]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
care only for the §elf before society.2" That philosophy, which brought
indiscipline and love for material wealth, needs to be reversed. The au-
thorities have to lead the way in this exercise. The punishment for front-
ing need not be unduly harsh provided it is accompanied by restitution.
To ignore fronting is to attempt to build the nation on moral bankruptcy.
To attempt to build the nation without morality humanity and service
(patriotism) is an exercise in futility. The efforts by the Buhari Regime to
recover stolen property started well but soon got overzealous, antago-
nized the press, abridged freedom of speech, and interfered with the inde-
pendence of the judiciary. It did not take time for his regime, though
well-meaning initially, to learn that it is wrong to want to rule a nation
without a deep-seated concern for all the citizens. 2°1 Officials should en-
force local law without respect to rank. Nobody is above the law. To do
less is to return to status quo ante.
If Nigeria does not apply the law evenly to everyone, Umaru
Dikko's claim that someone is out there to get him may begin to garner
substance. As a former insider in Government circles, he knows who the
real power brokers are. For this reason, it seems reasonable for the Gov-
ernment to give him safe escort to Nigeria under international law to
assist in recovering all monies and assets due the country.20 2 Today, in-
ternational cooperation has assumed new importance in civil and crimi-
nal areas.
Many lessons clearly emerge. Without law enforcement, Nigeria's
new economic recovery plans will need a miracle to succeed. Indications
are that the new economic, fiscal, and foreign exchange arrangements
initiated by President Babangida are bringing Nigeria some degree of
credibility.203 There must be a way of eliminating the economic rents
that encourage fronting and in turn attract the urban population. This
task cannot be oversimplified because it calls for support from agricul-
tural productivity, employment, and changes in culture-including law
enforcement. The rule that no one, not even the world's richest person,
200. See C. ACHEBE supra note 13, at 27 (discussing the various shades of social indis-
cipline that should be addressed if Nigeria is to survive); see also, Winning WAI (War Against
Indiscipline), The Guardian, Sept. 4, 1984, at 8, col. 1, 2.
201. Buhari's Regime learned that discretionary justice does no one any good. It catches
up with even the leaders and judges eventually. See Looking Back on 1985, supra note 77.
202. Umaru Dikko should be given justice in Nigeria. The people are looking forward to
this and the trial of all others under rule of law with all the constitutional protections pertain-
ing thereto.
203. See Special Article from the Central Bank of Nigeria 1982 and Foreign Private Invest-
ment in Nigeria in 1984. Reports from Statistics and Economics Division Research Depart-
ment, Central Bank of Nigeria 1984.
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can unjustly take anything with them when they depart Nigeria should
be emphasized as a lesson that service is what counts. Because material-
ism is not the answer, the Government must take a different road back to
economic sanity.2' This means that the Nigerian Government must
only deal with people of integrity at key positions in the Government and
give them the necessary support.
Nigeria must stop condoning fronting and those distortions that
make it a profitable venture. It has eliminated distortions such as licens-
ing and many have lauded this move. The Government's abolition of the
commodity boards was wise and timely. That it also revamped the for-
eign exchange market is undoubtedly a remarkable achievement
although it still skirts outright devaluation. The black currency market
remains a problem. These distortions make life cumbersome for both the
non-elites and the poor. The Government quickly recognized this and
has been responding with deliberate speed.
A return to economic sanity also calls for a reassessment of the gains
and the losses generated by the NEPD and other relevant laws. If
Babangida's plans are to usher in the long expected salvation, fronting is
sure to be the obstacle that will block it. It is a large, worldwide ethical
problem.2 ' 5 Many former Nigerian politicians are currently planning
strategies to return to civil rule in 1992.206 This development makes it
urgent for President Babangida to update the election laws by promul-
gating a decree that regulates the conduct of persons aspiring to public
offices. This decree should address the relationship between public offi-
cials and racketeering which destroyed the earlier regimes. If
Babangida's Regime is to be distinguished from others, he must require
public officials to be role models. Hence acceptance of public office
would demand accountability and service to the nation. The decree must
educate aspirants that accepting a public office is also an acknowledge-
ment that the official is not above the law and will be prosecuted for even
204. See the Book of Psalms, ch. 49 (especially verses 10, 16-20).
205. Fronting has become one of the world's most serious ethical problems. It was fea-
tured in the Iran-Contra Hearing;, it occupies a key role in the drug traffi; and it is crippling
world, country, state, and municipal governments. Development planners cannot ignore this
legal malaise.
All over the world, it is destroying beautiful and priceless cultures for a subhuman culture
of drugs. For Nigeria, the consequences have been serious in terms of human lives. All patri-
ots must rise in support of the Babangida Administration. See Murder Incorporated, Nigerian
Newswatch, Mar. 2, 1987, at 22.
206. Several groups, despite the 1986 ban on politics for five years, have surfaced in differ-
ent parts of the country. Among them are the Charity Club, the Oriental Club, the People's
Front, and the Trust Group. All are gradually organizing in anticipation of the lifting of the
ban on politics in 1992.
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the appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest.20 7
During the defunct civilian regime, representatives and advisers
commingled their personal interests with those of the public. Most of the
political appointees lived above the law.20 After the military took over,
many officers fell into the same mistakes that they promised to eradicate.
For example, when an armed or uniformed policeman takes a bribe at a
traffic check point, he is no different from a regular armed robber. It is
no different with a public official who uses his influence for personal ag-
grandizement. Those who failed the nation must not return to the fore-
front without a sincere commitment to service and accountability.
Certainly, many former politicians are fine persons who danced to
the indiscipline of the party and the leadership. At the same time there
must be room for morally strong younger participants to usher in some
seriously needed ethical standards. To amalgamate these two groups re-
quires a new dynamic approach-a new decree.
This Article suggests that the new decree:
1) Abhor the abuse or sale of public office for any personal gains;
2) Provide a different category of compensation for future political
office holders;
3) Require that public servants live in their own homes. The Gov-
ernment could help them acquire a moderate home on a loan guarantee
basis;
4) Require that they pay their own utilities like any other citizen;
5) Require that they be full time representatives depending wholly
on their income from public service; that any prior business relations be
disclosed; and that they place their assets in a blind trust for the duration
of their assignment to avoid conflicts of interest;
6) Require that they have had no affiliation with drug pushers or to
immediately sever such connections to prevent further infestation of
other public officers;
7) Require that they shun racketeering of any sort and to report the
same whenever suspected or observed as a public duty;
207. The power of judges to enforce the law should be clearly defined within the context of
separation of powers. This will prevent a return to the 1983 pattern of elections quite reminis-
cent of 1483-1485. (England was infested with chivalry and biigandage from "livery and
maintenance" which intimidated the judiciary.) The Nigerian Supreme Court struggled with
and denied such influences in 1983 in the post-election legal battle between former governors
Chief Jim Nwobodo and Chief Christian Onoh, both gubernatorial candidates from the Anam-
bra State of Nigeria. For details on "livery and maintenance" and its impact on the British




8) Require that they do not act as front, decoy or agents for the
purpose of defrauding the nation. Penalties for Violation of any of the
above in any form is ten to twenty years imprisonment on each count;
9) Penalties for fronting:
(a) maximum penalty when drug related regardless of the conse-
quences. The question is whether it effects the vital interest of the
nation;
(b) ten to twenty years for each count if currency or oil related; and
(c) ten to twenty years for each count if related to contracts that
undermine the economic security of the nation;
10) Persons using children as front in the attempted overthrow of
the Government should be considered dangerous. Reasoning along these
lines, President Babangida can give serious aspirants to political positions
of leadership warnings in advance. Nigeria is yearning for good honest
and incorruptible leaders. Paving the way for this kind of transition will
best memorialize his name after his Administration.
From the progress made so far on the economic and political fronts,
President Babangida deserves a guarded measure of praise. He needs the
support of all the citizens especially honest planners and advisers in deal-
ing with the monumental decisions ahead. But he must also enlist coop-
eration and assistance at the international level. The fronting and
fraudulent currency practices, the drug and criminal connections, and
the other practices that affect the country from the outside make the
move in the international direction imperative. The recent decision of
the Swiss Government to return to the Government of the Philippines
monies hauled out of that country by way of fronting and fraudulent
practices may be the long-sought direct positive knock-out of corruption
in high places. It is a lesson for all countries and not just for the LDCs.
It is a plus for international cooperation in international relations.'
209. See Buried Treasure, Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
19891

